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A Party That Won’t Spoil
MINOR PARTIES, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND 
FUSION VOTING*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the 2000 Presidential race 2,882,955 Americans cast 
their votes for Ralph Nader, the Green Party candidate.1 When
Republican George W. Bush won a narrow victory, many 
argued that Ralph Nader caused Democrat Al Gore’s defeat.2
Nader was deemed a “spoiler.”3 Democratic Party leaders were
angry, and they made that anger public. For instance,
according to one elected Democrat, Nader “divorced himself
from the very ideals that made him a worthwhile political
actor. He sold out his constituency.”4 The anger over the
* © 2005 Elissa Berger. All Rights Reserved. 
1 See Federal Election Commission, 2000 Official Presidential General
Election Results, at www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last modified Dec.
2001).
2 See, e.g., Sheila R. Cherry, Nader Raids the Democrats, INSIGHT, Dec. 4,
2000, at 24; James Dao, Angry Democrats, Fearing Nader Cost Them the Presidential
Race, Threaten to Retaliate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at B3; The Spoiler, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 2000, at A9. For the argument that, contrary to the
conventional view, Buchanan had a greater impact on the election than Nader, see
David Leonhardt, Was Buchanan the Real Nader?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at 44. 
3 See, for example, the news articles listed supra, note 2. A “spoiler” is a 
candidate who has no chance of winning, but whose candidacy deprives another of
success. See MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at www.m-w.com (last visited
May 15, 2005).
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4 See Peter DeMarco, D.C. Dems Gore Nader for Crashing the Party, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2001, at 2 (quoting Rep. Robert Wexler). See also Michael Powell,
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outcome of the 2000 race survived the four years between 
presidential elections.5 In 2004, Ralph Nader was on the ballot 
for president once again, but this time, the Green Party did not 
endorse him.6 Party members hoped to avoid new accusations of 
spoiling and thought another Nader candidacy would attract 
would-be Democratic-voters away from John Kerry.7 Nader ran 
without the Green Party endorsement.8 He received only 
465,650 votes.9
In most American elections, only two candidates have a 
reasonable chance at victory. Minor parties are stuck in a cage 
twice locked: they must ask voters either to throw away their 
vote and have it not affect the outcome, or to vote and affect the 
outcome by “spoiling,” causing the victory of a candidate least 
preferred by the minor party constituency.10 Since voting for a 
third party candidate casts an insignificant vote or worse (i.e., 
furthers the success of an opponent), third party voting often 
seems irrational. The authors of Third Parties in America put 
it this way: 
To vote for a third party, citizens must repudiate much of what they 
have learned and grown to accept as appropriate political behavior, 
they must often endure ridicule and harassment from neighbors and 
friends, they must pay steep costs to gather information on more 
Seared but Unwilted; Democrats See Red. But Green Party Faithful Say They Made 
Their Point, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at C1 (“Ask the Democrats about Nader and 
their rumblings devolve into a rain of invective.”). 
5 For instance, in the fall of 2004 S.L. Price wrote an Op-Ed for the New 
York Times that began, “As a rule, my friends hate Ralph Nader. The conservative 
ones consider him a publicity hound who has it in for corporate America, and the 
liberals blame him for putting George W. Bush in the White House.” S.L. Price, Nader’s 
Remainders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at A19. 
6 In a blatant snub, the Green Party endorsed Texas attorney David Cobb. 
Cobb sought the Green Party nomination with a commitment to campaign in “safe 
states” only. See David Finkel, Nader Plays Down Green Party Rebuff, WASH. POST,
June 28, 2004, at A6; Lisa Chamberlain, The Dark Side of Ralph Nader, SALON.COM, at 
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/07/01/nader_jacobs/ (July 1, 2004). Nader 
won spots on the ballots of more than 30 states. See Susannah Rosenblatt, Nader is 
Still on the Radar in Key States, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at A35.  
7 See Dan Moffett, Greener Pastures for Ex-Naderites, PALM BEACH POST,
July 4, 2004, at 2E; Norman Solomon, Editorial, Nader Adrift, BALT. SUN, July 1, 2004, 
at 15A.
8 Nader ran as an independent candidate. In some states, he was able to get 
on the ballot line of a statewide minor party. See Michael Janofsky, Nader Presses On,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at G2. 
9 See Federal Election Commission, Federal Elections 2004 (May 2005), at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections2004.pdf. 
10 See LISA JANE DISCH, THE TYRANNY OF THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 127-28
(2002).
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obscure candidates, and they must accept that their candidate has 
no hope of winning.11
Nonetheless, people sometimes choose to vote on a 
minor party ballot line to send a message about their 
frustration with the two major parties and their candidates.12
This is probably why 2.8 million people voted for Nader in 
2000.13 The risk of “spoiling” or “wasting votes,” however, 
makes it hard for minor parties and independent candidates to 
consistently secure voters’ support at the ballot box, even if 
voters remain committed to the party and candidate’s 
ideology.14 This is probably why 2.4 million fewer voters chose 
to vote for Nader in 2004 than in 2000.15
If minor parties are allowed to endorse major party 
candidates, they could be effectively released from their 
political cage. Imagine a closely contested race between a 
Democrat (candidate X) and a Republican (candidate Y). A 
minor party, the Purple Party, endorses candidate X. The 
ballot has a column for each political party and in each column 
the name of that party’s nominee is printed. Candidate X, then, 
is listed twice. (See Appendix for a sample ballot.) Those who 
prefer candidate X to candidate Y can vote on either the 
Democratic or the Purple party ballot line for candidate X.
Let’s say the Purple Party platform strongly supports 
the right of same-sex couples to marry. A voter, who similarly 
supports gay marriage, hopes candidate X will win the election, 
but is frustrated with the way candidate X and the Democratic 
Party avoid the issue of same-sex marriage. Our hypothetical 
voter would be able to cast her vote for both the candidate she 
prefers and the political party she feels best represents her 
11 See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA 3 (2d ed. 
1996).
12 Id. at 9. 
13 See, e.g., James Dao, The 2000 Election: The Green Party, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2000, at A29 (quoting voters as saying “I voted for Nader because he was most 
aligned with my values” and “I voted my conscience”).  
14 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 81, 174-75 (explaining modern 
minor parties fielding their own candidates rarely last more than two election cycles). 
15 Television host Bill Maher, who voted for Nader in 2000, explained his 
switch in 2004 this way: “We all got a little reality slapped into us by George W. Bush . 
. . . I see [voting for Nader] as a bratty thing to have done.” See Tom Shales, Bill 
Maher: Back for More, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2004, at C1. Former Nader supporter 
Ronnie Dugger changed his position after the 2000 election and described Nader’s 
second presidential candidacy as a mistake in strategy and harmful to the progressive 
values he and Nader share. See Ronnie Dugger, Ralph, Don’t Run, NATION MAG., Dec. 
2, 2002, at 14. 
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views. This practice—voting for candidates that are endorsed 
by more than one political party—is known as fusion voting.  
In a fusion voting system, a single candidate can be 
nominated to run on more than one party’s ballot line.16 All 
votes for that candidate are added together to determine 
whether the candidate wins a majority of votes, regardless of 
the ballot line on which the vote was cast. But each party’s 
votes are also tallied separately, so the election results reflect 
each party’s contribution to the candidate’s electoral success. 
Minor parties are able to influence the outcome of elections 
even when they do not field a viable candidate of their own.17
They can endorse a candidate who has a reasonable chance of 
victory, while also demonstrating that voters support their 
platform.18 Likewise, voters are able to express their support for 
the party’s principles, while avoiding the danger that their vote 
has been wasted in symbolic protest. As one pro-fusion party 
has boasted, fusion voting makes one vote count twice—first it 
sends a message about the issues the voter cares about and 
then it helps elect a candidate.19
16 The broadest definition of fusion voting would include ballot rules that 
allow more than one party to be listed as endorsing a single candidate, but only list a 
candidate once. Returning to our previous hypothetical, this would mean that 
candidate X would be listed under a column labeled Democrat and Purple Party, and 
candidate Y would be listed under a column labeled Republican. For the sake of this 
note, I use fusion voting to mean a system where each party would have its own ballot 
line. For an argument that any other kind of fusion voting scheme is unconstitutional, 
see Note, Fusion Candidacies, Disaggregation, and Freedom of Association, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1302 (1996). 
17 Of course, in a fusion voting system, minor parties could choose to run 
their own candidate if they felt so motivated. When fusion parties proliferated in 
America, minor parties often debated whether they should endorse a major party 
candidate or run an independent candidate. See DISCH, supra note 10, at 53-54. 
Generally, fielding a minor party candidate was a move of last resort. See ROSENSTONE 
ET AL., supra note 11, at 79. However, just the threat of not receiving a minor party 
endorsement kept major parties on their toes. Major party candidates would adopt 
parts of minor party platforms in order to secure the votes of minor party adherents. 
See DISCH, supra note 10, at 41.  
18 A party’s strong showing at the polls could translate into influence on 
policy. Returning to our hypothetical candidate after Election Day illustrates this 
point. Imagine Candidate Y receives 48% of the vote, more votes than Candidate X 
receives on the Democrat ballot line. However, when all votes are tallied, Candidate X 
is elected with 52% of the vote—44% from the votes on the Democratic ballot line, and 
8% of the votes from the Purple Party ballot line. (See Appendix for hypothetical 
election results.) Candidate X assumes her elected office knowing that she would not 
have won without the Purple Party’s support. Since she is constantly thinking about 
the future of her political career, she looks to the Purple Party’s platform and 
incorporates it into her policy agenda. For real world examples of this, see infra notes 
79-82 and accompanying text.  
19 Working Families Party Campaign Literature (on file with the author).  
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Unfortunately for minor parties, fusion voting is illegal 
in most states.20 And in spite of the burden anti-fusion laws 
place on minor parties’ freedom of association, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has upheld state bans on fusion voting.21 But 
when the Supreme Court closes a door, state constitutions may 
provide an open window.22
This Note argues that state anti-fusion laws violate the 
rights granted to political parties and voters under state 
constitutions. Part II of this Note describes the role of minor 
parties in American politics and briefly sketches the history of 
fusion voting in America. Part III summarizes the Supreme 
Court’s approach to the rights of political parties and discusses 
Twin Cities Area New Party v. Timmons,23 in which the 
Supreme Court upheld Minnesota’s fusion ban. Part IV argues 
that state courts can strike down anti-fusion laws based on 
state constitutional rights.
II. MINOR PARTIES AND FUSION VOTING
Increasingly, voters identify themselves as 
“independent” and voter registration information suggests 
Americans want more than the Democrats and Republicans 
have to offer.24 Third parties would provide more variety in the 
political landscape if allowed to thrive.25 Minor parties broaden 
20 STEVE COBBLE & SARAH SISKIND, FUSION: MULTIPLE PARTY NOMINATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 9-45 (Center for a New Democracy 1983), available at http://www. 
nmef.org/cobble_siskind.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005) (describing each state’s laws as 
they relate to fusion voting). Cobble and Siskind categorize twenty-five states as 
having statutes that explicitly prohibit fusion voting. They list another fifteen states 
and the District of Columbia that require candidates be members of the political party 
that has nominated them, thereby indirectly prohibiting fusion voting. See id. Since 
Cobble and Siskind published their research, Arkansas and Utah enacted anti-fusion 
laws, raising the count of states with direct bans on fusion to twenty-seven. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 7-7-204 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-201 (2)(a)(ii) (2004). See also 
Noel E. Oman, One-Party-at-a-Time, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 1997, at 4B;
Utah Attacks Fusion, 13 BALLOT ACCESS NEWS 11 (Feb. 8, 1998), available at
http://www.ballot-access.org/1998/0208.html.  
21 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) 
(upholding Minnesota’s anti-fusion law). The Supreme Court recognized that anti-
fusion laws imposed burdens on a minor party’s First Amendment associational rights 
and that while these burdens were not severe, neither were they trivial. See id. at 363.
22 See infra Part IV.A. 
23 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363.  
24 See Over 25% of Voters Are Not Registered Dems or Reps, 19 BALLOT 
ACCESS NEWS 10 (Feb. 1, 2004), available at http://www.ballot-access.org/2004/ 
0201.html. See also MICAH L. SIFRY, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THIRD PARTY POLITICS IN 
AMERICA 49 (2002) (summarizing data from the Committee for the Study of the 
American Electorate, National Election Studies, and various state sources). 
25 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-41 (1957) 
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the debate; they raise issues that the major parties refuse to 
address.26 The abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage, for 
instance, first found homes in the platforms of minor parties.27
With more choices at the ballot box, voter participation would 
likely increase.28 And with more viable parties, resulting 
competition might make major parties more responsive and 
accountable to voters.29
Contemporary politics in the United States, however, is 
a game with only two teams: the Democrats and the 
Republicans.30 Minor parties watch from the sidelines rather 
than play on the field. Candidates running solely on minor 
party ballot lines barely make a blip on election return charts 
unless they have extreme wealth or celebrity status.31
Moreover, when non-major party candidates have the 
opportunity to impact an election, that impact is often 
considered destructive. On learning of Ralph Nader’s intent to 
run in 2004, for example, progressive commentators predicted 
“mind-boggling irrelevance—but with a potential for 
catastrophic mischief.”32
(explaining that when there are only two political parties, their platforms tend to 
reflect the center of the political spectrum). 
26 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 221-23. 
27 See id. at 8; SIFRY, supra note 24, at 8.  
28 See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 53. Cf. Arend Lijiphart, Unequal Participation: 
Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (suggesting 
multiple parties in a proportional representation system would increase voter turnout 
because it would give “voters more choices and . . . [eliminate] the problem of wasted 
votes”). 
29 See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Not Allow The States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans From Political 
Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 344 (“Without third parties to challenge the 
positions of the two major parties and their candidates, the major parties are likely to 
become (some would say, remain) complacent and unresponsive to social pressures and 
movements.”). 
30 Disch notes Americans would never accept only two options as consumers, 
but they seem to accept such limited choices as voters. See DISCH, supra note 10, at 7. 
Hasen similarly suggests the absence of marketplace competition results in poor 
representation by the party duopoly. See Hasen, supra note 29, at 344. And Sifry quips, 
“For a country that prides itself as the heartland of free market capitalism, this lack of 
competition in the political arena is not just perverse. It is positively unhealthy.” See
SIFRY, supra note 24, at 7. 
31 Reform Party candidate Jesse Ventura became Minnesota Governor in 
1998 because of his celebrity status and Minnesota’s public financing laws. See DISCH,
supra note 10, at 1-4; SIFRY, supra note 24, at 42. Similarly, presidential candidate 
Ross Perot was able to garner 19% of the popular vote because he was independently 
wealthy. See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 3. On the high cost of even getting an 
independent candidate on the ballot, let alone garnering votes, see Samuel Issacharoff, 
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 
687 (1998). 
32 Harold Meyerson et al., He’s Back: Nader is running for president again. 
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Minor parties have not always been in this predicament. 
They used to play a major role in American elections.33 Up until 
the early 1900s, minor parties could endorse major party 
candidates34 and the same candidate could appear more than 
once on the ballot.35 Voters could vote for a candidate on the 
ballot line of whichever party appealed to them most. When 
votes were tallied, minor parties simultaneously helped elect 
candidates to office and demonstrated the parties’ own 
popularity at the polls. Votes translated into power over elected 
officials who wanted to run for reelection with minor parties’ 
endorsements.36 Major parties, too, watched closely the votes 
that minor parties garnered. Key issues of vote-getting minor 
parties would be absorbed into major party platforms.37 The 
ability of minor parties to “fuse” their endorsements with major 
parties’ endorsements “[guaranteed] that dissenters’ votes 
could be more than symbolic protest, that their leaders could 
gain office, and that their demands might be heard.”38
The decline of fusion voting began when state 
governments took charge of elections. In the 19th century, 
political parties controlled the electoral process. Parties 
themselves used to be responsible for printing ballots listing 
their slate of candidates.39 As voters went to the polls, party 
activists would pass out party tickets.40 Casting a vote was as 
simple as dropping the ticket into the ballot box.41 The 
simplicity of this process created opportunities for corruption. 
For example, without government regulation, voters could be 
tricked into casting their vote on what they thought was a 
Four reasons why this is a big mistake, AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE, Feb. 23, 2004, 
available at http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2004/02/meyerson-h-02-23.html. 
33 During the 19th Century, both the Democrats and Republicans were 
considered “major” parties but neither was a “majority” party. They won elections by 
forming coalitions with minor parties. See Peter H. Argersinger, A Place on the Ballot: 
Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287, 288-89 (1980). 
34 Id. at 288-89. 
35 It might be more accurate to say that the same candidate could appear on 
more than one party’s ballot—ballots were printed by political parties, not by the 
government. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
36 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 80 (“After several elections, 
either the conditions that originally precipitated the parties’ formation disappeared, or 
one of the major parties took up the third parties’ cause.”).  
37 See id. at 8, 43-44. 
38 See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 288-89. 
39 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 19-20. 
40 See id.  
41 See id.; Argersinger, supra note 33, at 291. If a voter wanted to vote for 
candidates of different parties (ticket-splitting), he could write his preferred choice on 
any parties’ ticket. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 20. 
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Republican ballot, but was actually a listing of Democratic 
candidates.42 Moreover, different parties’ ballots were different 
sizes and colors.43 Onlookers could see by the ballot in voters’ 
hands for whom they were voting.44 The 1888 presidential 
campaign seemed particularly crooked.45 It proved a catalyst for 
states to adopt the Australian system of secret ballot.46
Under the Australian ballot system, state governments 
started printing ballots.47 State printed ballots protected the 
privacy of voters’ choices—every ballot looked the same.48 In 
addition, the new voting system eliminated the distribution of 
ballots that looked like the slate of one party but actually listed 
the candidates of another party.49
The new system brought the need for new rules. 
Procedures were required to decide which candidates’ names 
would be printed on the ballot.50 As part of the new laws, 
legislators delivered a near fatal blow to minor parties, 
enacting anti-fusion rules that prohibited multiple parties from 
endorsing the same candidate.51
While most of the Australian ballot laws were enacted 
to rid the electoral process of corruption, anti-fusion laws had a 
less noble motivation.52 The electoral successes of fusion tickets 
threatened some lawmakers. Majority Republican legislatures 
were first to realize they could use the trend of ballot reform to 
remove a tool that often benefited their rivals.53 In 1893, South 
42 See, e.g., Daniel v. Simms, 39 S.E. 690, 694 (W. Va. 1901) (decrying the 
vulnerability of the old system in which “[a] voter, coming upon the ground and 
desiring to vote the Democratic ticket, might have one of these fraudulent tickets 
placed in his hands, and, without examining it closely, deposit it, and thus be 
defrauded out of his vote as to that particular office in which he felt most deeply 
interested”). 
43 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 19-20. 
44 See id. at 19-20. 
45 See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 290-91. 
46 See id.
47 See generally LIONEL E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY 
OF AN AMERICAN REFORM (1968).  
48 See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 290-91. 
49 See id.
50 See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 20.  
51 See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 291. 
52 See id. at 292 (“[T]he [anti-fusion] law . . . was intended to promote the 
dissolution of party ties while giving Republicans the residual benefits of them.”). In 
addition to anti-fusion laws, other mean-spirited laws were included in states’ reform 
packages. It was during this time that legislators instituted poll taxes and literacy 
tests with the goal of disenfranchising African Americans. See Paul R. Petterson, 
Partisan Autonomy or State Regulatory Authority? The Court as Mediator, in THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 113-14 (David K. Reyden ed., 2d ed. 
2002).
53 See Brief for the Respondent at 7, Timmons, 520 U.S. 351 (No. 95-1608); 
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Dakota lawmakers enacted the first anti-fusion law, preventing 
a candidate from being listed more than once on a ballot.54
Oregon, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio passed analogous laws 
in 1895.55 By 1899, eight more states had passed anti-fusion 
laws.56 All were passed by majority Republican legislatures, 
whose members wanted to prevent the cooperation between 
Democrats and minor parties.57 A Michigan lawmaker 
forthrightly declared, “We don’t propose to allow the Democrats 
to make allies of the Populists, Prohibitionists, or any other 
party, and get up combination tickets against us. We can whip 
them single-handed, but don’t intend to fight all creation.”58
Legislators were rarely so blunt. Most defended anti-
fusion laws as good-government reform.59 But the actual 
motivation for these laws was not lost on one journalist, who 
renamed the anti-fusion law “the law providing for the 
extinction and effacement of all parties but the Democratic and 
Republican.”60 Nor was the partisan motivation lost on 
Democratic or minor party members.61 A Populist Party 
member declared that the anti-fusion law “practically 
disfranchises every citizen who does not happen to be a 
member of the party in power . . . . They are thus compelled to 
either lose their vote . . . or else to unite in one organization. It 
would mean that there could only be two parties at one time.”62
Without fusion, what once was an effective way to express a 
voter’s ideology now became a wasted gesture—a throwaway 
vote. Unsurprisingly, voters stopped voting for minor parties, 
ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 48-80; Argersinger, supra note 33, at 289-90. 
Fusion voting was most common in the Midwest and West where Republicans more 
often were in control of the state legislatures. See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 289-
90. Several eastern states did not immediately pass anti-fusion laws because the major 
parties were strong enough to prevent support for minor parties without legislating 
against them. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 20 n.5 (noting the following 
states’ history of fusion: Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut). Except for Connecticut, each of these states has since enacted anti-fusion 
laws. See COBBLE & SISKIND, supra note 20, at 8.
54 See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 297. 
55 See id. at 298-301. 
56 See id. at 302 (listing the following states as having enacted anti-fusion 
laws: California, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin and Wyoming).
57 See id. at 302-03. 
58 See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 296 (quoting DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 
1, Jan. 5, 1893). 
59 See id. at 292. 
60 See id. at 304.  
61 See id. at 302; DISCH, supra note 10, at 52. 
62 See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 304 (quoting KALAMAZOO WEEKLY 
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 20, 1895). 
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and the parties were forced to the sidelines of American 
politics.63
Today, anti-fusion laws exist in all but eight states.64 In 
the states that allow fusion voting, seven have laws or party 
rules that make it difficult, if not impossible to establish a 
statewide fusion party.65 For instance, Connecticut laws allow a 
candidate to be endorsed by more than one official political 
party in a given election,66 but to become an official political 
party, with the ability to endorse candidates in all Connecticut 
elections, the party must run an independent candidate in a 
gubernatorial race and win 20% of the vote.67 New parties, 
without official status, cannot endorse candidates already 
nominated by existing parties.68 Winning 20% of the vote in a 
statewide election with an independent candidate is difficult. 
More importantly, it is unlikely a pro-fusion party would want 
63 See Brief of Amici Curiae of Twelve University Professors and Center For 
A New Democracy In Support of Respondent Twin Cities Area New Party, Timmons,
520 U.S. 351 (No. 95-1608); ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 149.
64 The eight states are Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Mississippi, New York, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont. See supra note 20 and accompanying 
text. 
65 See COBBLE & SISKIND, supra note 20, at 10-45 (describing major party 
rules and election laws that may make fusion voting difficult in states that do not have 
anti-fusion laws). 
66 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-453t (2003) (“Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to prohibit any candidate from appearing on the ballot as the nominee of two 
or more major or minor parties for the same office.”).
67 Parties retain official status across the entire state when they win 20% of 
the vote for governor or have registered 20% of voters. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-372(5) 
(2003) (“‘Major party’ means (A) a political party or organization whose candidate for 
Governor at the last-preceding election for Governor received, under the designation of 
that political party or organization, at least twenty per cent of the whole number of 
votes cast for all candidates for Governor, or (B) a political party having, at the last-
preceding election for Governor, a number of enrolled members on the active registry 
list equal to at least twenty per cent of the total number of enrolled members of all 
political parties on the active registry list in the state”); Parties who win 1% of the vote 
in a given election only have party status in that district, for that office. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 9-372(6) (“‘Minor party’ means a political party or organization which is 
not a major party and whose candidate for the office in question received at the last-
preceding regular election for such office, under the designation of that political party 
or organization, at least one per cent of the whole number of votes cast for all 
candidates for such office at such election.”).  
68 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-453t (2003) (“[T]he nomination of a candidate by 
a major or minor party under this chapter, for any office shall disqualify such 
candidate from appearing on the ballot by nominating petition for the same office.”). If 
a party does not have official status, it must nominate its candidate through the 
petitioning process, thereby precluding the nomination of a candidate supported by an 
official political party. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-379 (2003) (“No name of any candidate 
shall be printed on any official ballot at any election except the name of a candidate 
nominated by a major or minor party unless a nominating petition for such candidate 
is approved by the Secretary of the State as provided in sections 9-453a to 9-453p, 
inclusive.”).  
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to risk spoiling in its election debut.69 Therefore, establishing a 
fusion party through a statewide election in Connecticut is 
almost impossible.70
New York is the only state in the nation where fusion 
voting has remained a common practice.71 As a result, minor 
parties have thrived.72 Currently, three minor parties have 
official party status in New York state.73 In one recent election, 
minor parties captured more than 20% of the total vote.74 In 
New York’s local, statewide and federal elections, minor 
parties’ vote totals have tipped major party candidates to 
victory. Rudolph Guiliani, for example, became mayor of New 
York City only because the votes he won on the Liberal Party 
ballot line were added to the votes he won on the Republican 
Party ballot line.75 George Pataki was able to secure the 
governorship only by adding the votes cast on the Conservative 
Party line to the votes cast on the Republican Party line.76
Similarly, New York’s Electoral College votes have been 
determined by minor party votes: neither Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy nor Ronald Reagan would have 
69 See Lee Foster, 3rd Party Planting Roots in State, HARTFORD COURANT,
Oct. 6, 2004, at B1 (reporting that one Working Families Party candidate dropped out 
“to avoid stealing votes” from the Democratic candidate in a closely contested state 
senate race). 
70 However, a new party that has won 1% of the vote for an independent 
candidate in a non-statewide election is able to “fuse” endorsements with other parties 
the next time that local office is up for election. Winning 1% of the vote in a local 
election is more achievable and strategically less problematic than winning 20% of the 
vote in a statewide election. Activists in Connecticut are running independent 
candidates in local races, and have achieved official party status in at least 66 districts. 
See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 297; Gail Ellen Daly, Working Families Happy With 
Results, CHRONICLE (Willimantic, Conn.) (Nov. 5 2004), available at http://www.ct-
workingfamilies.org/WCPleased.html (last visited May 15, 2005). 
71 See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 228-89. 
72 See Brief of the Conservative Party of New York and Liberal Party of New 
York as Amici Curie in Support of Respondent at 13, Timmons (No. 95-1608).  
73 See NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Running for Office, at
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/portal/page?_pageid=153,42096,153_53318:153_53330
&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Apr. 14, 2005) (“The current political 
parties are the Republican, Democratic, Independence, Conservative, and Working 
Families parties.”). For official party status, minor parties must win 50,000 votes each 
gubernatorial election. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-104 (McKinney 2005). In 2002, the 
Independence Party, the Conservative Party and the Working Families Party met and 
surpassed that threshold. See Erik Kris, Some Minor Parties Lost Automatic Ballot 
Status, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Nov. 7, 2002, at A14. 
74 The minor party vote in three recent statewide elections are as follows: in 
2004 U.S. Presidential race, 5%; 2004 U.S. Senate race, 9%; 2002 Gubernatorial race, 
22%. Elections results are available from the New York State Board of Elections at 
www.elections.state.ny.us. 
75 See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 228-29. 
76 See id.
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carried New York by the votes cast on major party lines alone.77
Each of them needed the votes that were cast on the minor 
party lines to win New York.  
New York’s minor parties do not only influence the 
outcome of specific elections; their success at the polls also 
leads to influence over politicians in office.78 The Conservative 
Party, for example, pressures Republican legislators to oppose 
abortion and gay rights with threats of running independent 
challengers against Republican incumbents.79 The Working 
Families Party has also linked its possession of a ballot line to 
policy gains. For instance, a few months after the Working 
Families Party helped elect a Democrat to the Suffolk County 
legislature, the county enacted a living wage law, a legislative 
priority for the Working Families Party.80 The Working 
Families Party believes that members of the county legislature 
saw the decisive part the minor party played in the election 
and thought of their own upcoming reelections when passing 
the living wage bill.81 Highlighting the importance of fusion 
voting in this legislative victory, Daniel Cantor, executive 
director of the Working Families Party had this to say: 
The ability to clearly demonstrate a minor party’s electoral strength 
via the fusion vote was absolutely essential to winning the living 
wage in Suffolk. In fact, it’s no overstatement to suggest that the 210 
votes we got on our line that proved the “margin of victory” in one 
legislative race resulted in 4,000 low-wage workers getting an 
increase in salary of nearly $2,000 per year. That’s the power of 
fusion.82
77 See id. at 229. 
78 See DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN, THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
130-32 (1974) (describing the impact fusion parties have had on the direction of New 
York policy). 
79 Richard Perz-Pena, Despite Size Conservative Party is a Force to Reckon 
With, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at B1.  
80 See, e.g., Emi Endo, Working Families Party is Working For Influence,
NEWSDAY, July 19, 2001, at A33; Amy Waldman, New Party is Courting Liberal 
Constituencies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at 44.  
81 See WORKING FAMILIES PARTY, Fusion Voting—Our (Not So) Secret 
Weapon, at http://www.workingfamiliesparty.org/fusion.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2005) (“Every member of the Republican controlled County Legislature noticed the 
WFP’s role in the Lindsay victory. They were soon up for reelection and realized the 
importance of appealing to our voters. So, they decided to pass the [living wage] bill.”); 
See also Michael Tomasky, Inside Agitators, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 4, 2002 (“The 210 votes 
William Lindsay got on the WFP line provided his margin of victory. For a small party, 
that means leverage, which the WFP converted into the passage of living-wage 
legislation in Suffolk.”). 
82 E-mail from Daniel Cantor, Executive Director, Working Families Party, to 
author (Dec. 15, 2004) (on file with author). 
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Inspired by the successes of minor parties in New York, 
a few pragmatic idealists began thinking about how to export 
the New York model to other states in the late 1980s.83 Joel 
Rogers, a political science professor at the University of 
Wisconsin, and Daniel Cantor, then a political organizer in 
New York, believed that American democracy would be 
improved if minor parties had a stronger voice in politics.84
They recognized, however, the political irrelevancy of modern 
minor parties. The solution was simple: fusion.85 The solution to 
state anti-fusion laws was also simple: sue.86
Joel Rogers and Daniel Cantor spent the next few years 
building the “New Party,” a progressive political party that 
they hoped would win a ballot line by challenging the 
constitutionality of anti-fusion laws.87 The New Party’s strategy 
was to build a grassroots, membership base while planning 
litigation.88 The party’s motto was fitting: “Start Small. Think 
Big.”89 They were confident that their day in court would result 
in victory. They were wrong.90
III.  THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND ANTI-FUSION LAWS
The New Party sought to challenge anti-fusion laws on 
First Amendment grounds. The First Amendment of the 
federal Constitution can be construed to protect fusion voting 
in two ways. First, voting might be seen as expression of 
political views, and thus protected by the right to freedom of 
expression. Fusion voting is a means by which voters and 
parties can critique the major parties’ position on issues and 
83 See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 228-31.  
84 See id. at 229-30. According to a 1999 memorandum, Cantor and Rogers 
believed that the major parties offered progressives “a ‘devil’s bargain’ . . . in which 
support is generally exchanged for frustration” but “that the history of third party 
alternatives seems even more grim.” Creating a new political party with the power to 
endorse major party candidates would “give voice to [progressives’] political aspiration 
in ways that matter in conventional electoral arenas.” See Memorandum from Dan 
Cantor & Joel Rogers, Party Time, 7, 8, 12 (May 1990) (on file with author).  
85 See Cantor & Rogers, Party Time, supra note 84, at 10-11.
86 See Memorandum from Dan Cantor & Joel Rogers, Sue!, 1-2 (May 1990) 
(on file with author).  
87 See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 231-32. 
88 See id. at 230-31; Cantor & Rogers, Party Time, supra note 84.  
89 A different phrase captures the New Party’s grassroots message: “It’s 
about people. It’s about democracy. It’s about time.” See New Party paraphernalia (on 
file with the author). 
90 They were at least part wrong. They had some initial success, but the 
Supreme Court ruled against their challenge to anti-fusion laws in Timmons. See infra 
notes 123-35 and accompanying text. 
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anti-fusion laws limit this expression. Second, activities of 
political parties are activities of individuals associating with 
each other for a common purpose, and as such might be 
protected by the right to freedom of association to achieve 
expressive goals. Preventing a minor party from endorsing a 
major party candidate could be seen as interfering with the 
party’s core functions. This section will summarize the federal 
jurisprudence on these two claims, and then discuss Timmons
v. Twin Cities Area New Party,91 in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled against the New Party’s constitutional challenge to 
anti-fusion laws.  
Checking a box, pulling a lever, punching out a chad, or 
touching a screen in the ballot booth is a statement of belief as 
well as a declaration of preference.92 The U.S. Constitution 
protects the right to participate in elections as part of the 
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,93 but 
voting may also be understood to be protected by the right to 
freedom of expression as guaranteed in the First Amendment.94
An election marks the temporary end of a political debate and 
casting a vote is the “official expression of [a voter’s] judgment 
on issues of public policy.”95 Denying the ability of multiple 
political parties to endorse a single candidate denies voters the 
opportunity of using the ballot to communicate their opinions 
effectively on their government’s course of action.  
Although this argument may be philosophically 
compelling, the Supreme Court rejected the concept of ballot 
based expression in Burdick v. Takushi.96 In that case, the 
Court considered whether a state could prohibit voters from 
writing in names of preferred candidates who did not appear on 
the printed ballot.97 Several lower federal courts had previously 
91 520 U.S. 351 (1997).  
92 See generally Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
330 (1993) (arguing that the right to vote should be protected because of the expressive 
function voting serves). 
93 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) 
(holding a resident of a school board district who did not own property and did not have 
children in the public schools could not be excluded from school board elections). The 
federal Constitution explicitly prohibits certain denials of the right to vote in the 
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments. See generally 
DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 71 (3d ed. 2004). 
94 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 245, 256. 
95 Id. 
96 504 U.S. 428 (1992).  
97 Id.
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concluded that write-in votes were a form of political 
expression and therefore protected by the First Amendment.98
In Burdick, the Supreme Court dismissed this view, declaring 
that “the function of the election process is ‘to winnow out and 
finally reject all but the chosen candidates,’ not to provide a 
means of giving vent to ‘short-range political goals, pique, or 
personal quarrel[s].’”99 The Court concluded that treating voting 
as an act of expression would “undermine the ability of States 
to operate elections fairly and efficiently.”100 Given Supreme 
Court precedent, the New Party rested its argument against 
anti-fusion laws on parties’ freedom of association rights, 
rather than on individuals’ expressive rights.101
The Supreme Court first formally announced that the 
constitution protected associational rights in 1958.102 In NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, a unanimous Court held that 
Alabama could not require the NAACP to provide its 
membership list to the state Attorney General because to do so 
would offend the NAACP’s right of association.103 The Court 
based the right of association in the right of expression, 
declaring that protecting effective advocacy requires protecting 
the right of individuals to act collectively.104 In Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, the Court further explained that the right to 
associate was an extension of other First Amendment 
freedoms.105 The Court said the “freedom to speak, to worship, 
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances 
could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State 
unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward 
those ends were not also guaranteed.”106 Associations formed 
98 See Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd., 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989);
Paul v. Indiana Election Bd., 743 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Burdick v. Takushi, 
737 F. Supp. 582 (D. Haw. 1990). 
99 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 
(1972)).
100 Id.
101 The New Party did argue that the ballot serves an expressive function, but 
it made the argument from the perspective of a party, not an individual voter. See Brief 
for the Respondent at 25, Timmons, 520 U.S. 351 (No. 95-1608) (“[T]he fusion ban 
interferes with the message sent to voters by the party, in the voting booth, that it has 
nominated a particular candidate, and it does so despite the fact that the State 
otherwise uses its ballot system for precisely this purpose.”).
102 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
103 See id. at 462-63. 
104 See id. at 460-61. 
105 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
106 Id. at 622. 
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with the purpose of engaging in activity protected by the First 
Amendment have been termed “expressive associations.”107
The rights of political parties as expressive associations 
can run headlong into state regulations of elections.108 The U.S. 
Constitution charges state governments with regulating federal 
elections,109 and the Court has implied that states have a duty 
to ensure all elections are fair and honest.110 Therefore, when 
faced with a law that infringes on the rights of political parties, 
the Court will balance the interest of the state in regulating 
elections against the burden on the party’s rights of 
association.111 The “rigorousness of [the Court’s] inquiry into the 
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to 
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.”112 Only regulations that severely burden 
those rights must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
state interest. A state can justify less serious infringements on 
associational freedom by showing a regulation furthered 
important interests.113
Prior to Timmons, the Supreme Court had applied this 
balancing test and struck down several state laws involving 
major parties’ associational rights. The Court had held that 
states cannot require parties to use a closed primary system,114
107 See Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive 
Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2001). 
108 For a discussion of how political parties fit within the expressive 
association framework, see id. The First Amendment applies to state action by way of 
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first case to recognize that 
First Amendment rights are incorporated into the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
110 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[T]here must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of 
order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”); Bullock v. 
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (“[A] State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the 
integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.”). 
111 The balancing test was articulated in Anderson v. Celebrezze:
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that 
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise 
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by 
its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the 
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the 
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a 
position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
112 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
113 Id.
114 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1996). A closed 
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prohibit parties from endorsing candidates in primary 
elections115 or compel parties to accept state delegates to a 
national convention who were not selected according to party 
rules.116 In these decisions, the Court established that the right 
of association meant “not only that an individual voter has the 
right to associate with the political party of her choice, but also 
that a political party has a right to identify the people who 
constitute the association, and to select a standard bearer who 
best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”117
The cases decided in the decades before Timmons also 
suggested that limiting ballot access for independent 
candidates might be especially hard for states to justify.118 One 
of the earliest cases about a minor party candidate proved to 
contain the strongest language. In Williams v. Rhodes, the 
Court considered an Ohio law that required a party to gather 
signatures from 10% of Ohio voters in order to secure a space 
on the ballot.119 The Court struck the law because “[n]ew parties 
struggling for their place must have the time and opportunity 
to organize in order to meet reasonable requirements for ballot 
position, just as the old parties have had in the past.”120 The 
Court dismissed the state’s argument that this law was 
justified out of protection for the two-party system:
[T]he Ohio system does not merely favor a “two-party system”; it 
favors two particular parties—the Republicans and the Democrats—
and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly. There is, of 
course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent 
monopoly on the right to have people vote for or against them. 
Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our 
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.121
New Party members’ analysis of this precedent left 
them feeling optimistic. Insofar as anti-fusion laws prevented 
primary would mean only party members would be allowed to vote in the party 
primary. See id. at 215. 
115 Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223-24 
(1989).
116 Democratic Party of the Untied States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 
U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
117 Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 (internal citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
118 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (holding Ohio’s filing deadline 
for petitions were too early); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 134 (holding Texas’ filing fees were 
excessive); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holding Ohio’s requirement for 
petitions signatures were too high). 
119 Williams, 393 U.S. at 23.  
120 Id. at 32. 
121 Id.
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parties from endorsing the candidate of the party’s choosing 
simply because another party had already nominated that 
candidate, they seemed vulnerable to First Amendment 
challenges. Given the particular burden anti-fusion laws placed 
on minor parties, the laws would seem especially difficult for a 
state to justify. In the words of Professor Theodore Lowi, the 
case “look[ed] like a constitutional no-brainer.”122
The first federal court challenge to anti-fusion laws took 
place in the Western District of Wisconsin.123 There, the district 
court upheld Wisconsin’s ban on fusion voting, and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed.124 Several years later, a district court in 
Minnesota also upheld an anti-fusion voting law, but this 
decision was reversed by the Eighth Circuit.125 The Supreme 
Court then reversed the Eighth Circuit in Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New Party.126
Timmons considered the right of the New Party to 
nominate a candidate for Minnesota State Representative 
previously nominated by the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party.127
The candidate, Andy Dawkins, wanted to run with the 
endorsements of both the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party and 
the New Party.128 The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party raised 
no objection to the New Party’s endorsement.129 When the New 
Party attempted to file the petition to nominate Dawkins, 
county officials refused to accept the nomination130 because 
Minnesota’s anti-fusion laws prevent a candidate from being 
twice nominated.131
122 Theodore J. Lowi, Editorial, Supreme Court Should Ban Fusion Tickets,
PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 31, 1996, at 9B. 
123 Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1991). 
124 See id. 
125 See Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 200 (8th Cir. 
1996).
126 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 370. 
127 See id. at 354. In Minnesota the two major parties are the Democratic-
Farmer-Labor Party and the Republican Party. Id. at 354 n.2. 
128 Id. at 354.
129 Id. 
130 Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 863 F. Supp. 988, 990 (D. Minn. 
1994).
131 Minnesota statute provides: 
(1) Major party candidates. No individual shall be named on any ballot as the 
candidate of more than one major political party. No individual who has 
been certified by a canvassing board as the nominee of any major political 
party shall be named on any ballot as the candidate of any other major 
political party at the next ensuing general election. 
(2) Candidates seeking nomination by primary. No individual who seeks 
nomination for any partisan or nonpartisan office at a primary shall be 
nominated for the same office by nominating petition, except as otherwise 
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The New Party filed a complaint in district court 
alleging a violation of the party’s associational rights as 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.132 The 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Minnesota, 
rejecting the minor party’s claim that the state’s anti-fusion 
law was unconstitutional.133 The Court of Appeals reversed that 
decision, finding that the fusion ban created a severe burden on 
minor parties’ associational rights and that the state could 
have enacted a more narrowly tailored law to achieve its 
goals.134 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a 6-3 
decision, reversed the Court of Appeals.135
The New Party argued that the anti-fusion law severely 
burdened its associational rights because it prohibited the 
party from nominating its preferred candidate.136 It claimed 
that “[n]othing is more fundamental to a party than the choice 
of candidates to represent it in electoral competition. Nothing 
is more important to a party’s ability to mobilize its supporters 
around candidates than its ability to identify those candidates, 
on the ballot, as its own.”137
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion, authored by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, recognized that political parties are 
guaranteed associational rights under the First Amendment. 
Those rights, however, could be limited by state laws 
reasonably regulating parties, elections and ballots.138 To 
determine if the New Party’s rights were violated, the Court 
engaged in a balancing test, “weigh[ing] the ‘character and 
magnitude’ of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those 
rights against the interests the State contends justify that 
burden, and consider[ing] the extent to which the State’s 
concerns make the burden necessary.”139
provided for partisan offices in section 204D.10, subdivision 2, and for 
nonpartisan offices in section 204B.13, subdivision 4.  
MINN. STAT. § 204B.04 (2004).  
132 See Twin Cities Area New Party, 863 F. Supp. at 988. The First 
Amendment applies to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
clause. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). (“It is 
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and 
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”). 
133 See id. at 994.  
134 See Twin Cities Area New Party, 73 F.3d at 200. 
135 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 356. 
136 Brief for the Respondent at 12, Timmons, 520 U.S. 351 (No. 95-1608). 
137 Id. 
138 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 357-58. 
139 See id. at 358. 
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The Supreme Court conceded that fusion bans interfere 
with minor parties’ associational rights, but the Court did not 
find the burden to be severe.140 To be sure, the Minnesota 
statute would prevent the New Party from having its preferred 
candidate listed on the ballot, but it would not prohibit the 
party from campaigning and supporting a candidate.141 Even if 
the ballot restriction limited the party’s ability to send a 
message to voters and to its preferred candidate, the Court was 
not convinced that a party had a right to use the ballot to send 
a message to voters.142 The Court explained, “[b]allots serve 
primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political 
expression.”143 Adhering to Burdick, the Court declined to 
acknowledge any constitutional protection for the expressive 
value of voting.144
Finding that the anti-fusion law did not severely burden 
minor parties, the Court held that the state did not need to 
survive strict scrutiny analysis in order be valid. The state 
articulated four reasons to justify the law: avoiding voter 
confusion, promoting candidate competition, preventing 
electoral distortions and ballot manipulations, and 
discouraging party splintering and unrestrained factionalism.145
After declaring these justifications sufficient to support 
Minnesota’s law, the Court introduced an additional reason to 
justify the ban on fusion, one that had not been raised by the 
state. For the first time, the Court declared that a state’s 
interest in the stability of its political structure allowed it to 
enact legislation promoting the two-party system.146
Building on previous cases that acknowledged a state’s 
interest in the stability of its government,147 the majority said 
that to achieve that goal, state laws could favor the two-party 
system.148 Although this was a new approach to election law for 
the Court, the opinion devoted relatively little space to the 
exploration of how fusion threatened the two-party system or 
how the two-party system encouraged stability.149 With 
140 See id. at 363. 
141 See id. at 358-59. 
142 Id.
143 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363 (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438). 
144 See id. See also supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
145 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364. 
146 See id. at 367. 
147 Eu, 489 U.S. at 226; Storer, 415 U.S. at 736. 
148 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367-68. 
149 See id.  
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references to James Madison’s fear of factions, the decision 
declared that states are permitted to enact laws that favor the 
two-party system in order to “temper the destabilizing effects of 
party-splintering and excessive factionalism.”150
The majority’s unsolicited defense of the two-party 
system was contrary to the Court’s past political party 
jurisprudence. In Williams, the Court had implied that 
protecting the major parties would not sufficiently justify 
infringement on a minor party’s associational rights.151 At oral 
arguments for Timmons, it is no wonder that counsel and 
courtroom observers were surprised by Justice Scalia’s 
questioning on the protection of the two-party system.152 When 
it looked like counsel for Minnesota was not willing to admit 
anti-fusion laws were intended to protect the major parties, 
Justice Scalia interjected: “Well, you wouldn’t concede the 
major point, would you, that there is something wrong about 
the state establishing its electoral machinery . . . to facilitate 
and encourage a two-party system . . . ?”153 Justice Scalia 
proceeded to guide counsel to argue that states should be able 
to choose whether and in what way they will protect the major 
parties, a point which, admittedly, counsel had not planned to 
assert.154
In dissent, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter 
argued that the Court should not have considered this 
justification, since the state had never raised it.155 Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, suggested that the 
protection of the two-party system was the “true basis” for the 
majority’s decision against the New Party and argued that 
even if the state had properly raised this justification, it would 
have been insufficient.156 In their view, the risks of government 
instability resulting from fusion voting were speculative, and 
150 See id. at 368 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)). 
Associations have great power and if not checked, Madison thought, associations could 
destroy popular government by implementing policies in opposition to the will and 
benefit of the majority. Indirect elections of the senate, the Electoral College and the 
tripartite nature of the federal government were designed to shield against the dangers 
of factions. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). See also infra note 229 and 
accompanying text. 
151 Williams, 393 U.S. at 23. 
152 See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 297. 
153 Transcript of oral argument at 25-26, Timmons, 520 U.S. 351, No. 95-1608, 
1996 WL 709359 (U.S. Oral. Arg. Dec. 4, 1996).  
154 See id. at 26-29.
155 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 377-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Ginsburg 
joining, Justice Souter joining in part). 
156 See id.
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the burden created by anti-fusion laws demanded a greater 
demonstration of threat.157 Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice 
Souter believed that anti-fusion laws might be justified based 
on a state interest of protecting the two-party system.158 To 
satisfy constitutional scrutiny, however, Justice Souter would 
have had the state demonstrate that fusion voting would, in 
fact, threaten the two-party system and that the disintegration 
of the two-party system would risk state instability. As the 
state had failed to do this, Justice Souter would not have 
upheld the law.159
The New Party’s day in court came and went, and a 
revival of fusion voting now seemed permanently buried in 
America’s electoral graveyard. State constitutions, however, 
have the ability to revive constitutional issues that the 
Supreme Court has killed.  
IV. CHALLENGING ANTI-FUSION LAWS BASED ON STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Protecting Rights through State Constitutions 
State constitutions are wholly independent documents; 
they are not drafted to echo the federal Constitution.160 In fact, 
many state constitutions were written and ratified prior to the 
federal Constitution.161 Framers of the federal Constitution 
decided to have the Bill of Rights apply only to the federal 
government because they believed that state constitutions 
sufficiently protected citizens from state governments.162 Even 
those state constitutions that were written after the adoption of 
the federal Bill of Rights borrowed from the language of the 
existing state constitutions more than from the federal 
Constitution.163 This history leads many scholars and jurists to 
agree with Justice William Brennan’s conclusion that “the 
decisions of the [Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, 
157 See id. 
158 See id. at 383 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
159 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
160 See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1-3(a) (3d ed. 2000). 
161 See id.
162 Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Introduction to TOWARD A USABLE 
PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 5 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb 
eds., 1991).  
163 See FRIESEN, supra note 160, § 5-2. 
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dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by 
counterpart provisions of state law.”164
Although state courts are free to interpret their 
constitutions without reference to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the federal Constitution, many courts look to 
the Supreme Court for guidance.165 Especially in the area of 
civil rights, Supreme Court decisions have influenced the scope 
of state constitutional protection for individual rights.166 There 
are exceptions. Some provisions of state constitutions are 
unique to the states and do not have federal counterparts.167
State courts are left to understand the meaning of 
constitutional guarantees to public education, for instance, 
without direction from the Supreme Court.168 Furthermore, for 
the first hundred and fifty years of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, state governments were not limited by the 
federal Bill of Rights.169 Courts intent on curbing abusive state 
action relied on their state, not federal, constitution.170
164 William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). Supreme Court decisions similarly 
acknowledge the independent nature of state constitutions. See, e.g., Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (“[A state may] adopt in its own 
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal 
Constitution.”). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36
SW. L.J. 951 (1982); Margaret H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn 
From Their Children”: Interpreting State Constitutions In An Age of Global 
Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633 (2004); Robert F. Williams, The Third State of 
the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (2003).  
165 See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 48 (1998). 
166 See id. 
167 See FRIESEN, supra note 160, § 1-3(b). 
168 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI § 1; Bd. Of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E. 2d 359, 
368-69 (1982) (interpreting the constitutional requirement of “free and common 
schools” to mean the legislature must provide a “sound basic” public education). Almost 
every state constitution guarantees its citizens an education, whereas the federal 
Constitution does not provide a right to an education. See Peter Enrich, Leaving 
Equality Behind: New Directs in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 105 
(1995). In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), that disparities in education financing do not violate the U.S. 
Constitution, numerous state courts held that their own constitutions require greater 
equity in school financing. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 
P.2d 806, 814 (Ariz. 1994) (listing cases). 
169 The Supreme Court did not apply the First Amendment to the action of 
state governments until 1925. See supra note 108. 
170 For example, in 1859, Wisconsin declared that government appointed 
counsel for indigent defendants was part of the right to fair trial guaranteed by the 
state constitution. See Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). More than a 
century later, the U.S. Supreme Court took a similar position. See Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951 (1982).  
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Over the last several decades, state courts have revived 
a practice of independent interpretations of their constitutions, 
finding greater protections for individual rights than those 
provided by the federal Constitution.171 Even state 
constitutional provisions that mirror language in the federal 
Constitution have been interpreted as more expansive than the 
federal Constitution.172 For instance, after the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld a state’s sodomy law in Bowers v. Hardwick 
against a right to privacy challenge,173 the Georgia court struck 
down its state’s sodomy law based on the Georgia constitution’s 
right to privacy.174
This Note explores state constitutional law generally as 
it applies to fusion voting, but each state’s constitution 
deserves its own analysis. That being said, there are shared 
characteristics of state constitutional law that make anti-fusion 
laws vulnerable to state constitutional challenges even though 
a federal challenge failed. First, there is an absence of 
federalism concerns when state courts are interpreting state 
constitutions.175 This means state courts may adopt a less 
deferential approach in analyzing state legislatures’ 
justifications for anti-fusion laws. Second, the history of state 
constitutional development reflects dedication to broad and 
diverse political participation.176 This conception of politics may 
mean minor political parties receive more protection under 
state constitutions than under the federal Constitution. 
Finally, several state courts have articulated a broader 
interpretation of freedom of expression than the Supreme 
Court has found in the federal Constitution.177 This means state 
171 See Ken Gormley, The Silver Anniversary of New Judicial Federalism, 66
ALB. L. REV. 797 (2003). 
172 The Maryland courts, for example, have “emphasized that, simply because 
a Maryland constitutional provision is in pari materia with a federal one or has a 
federal counterpart, does not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or 
applied in the same manner as its federal counterpart.” Dua v. Comcast Cable of 
Maryland, Inc., 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (Md. 2002). 
173 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
174 Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). The Georgia Court relied on 
language of the state constitution that is almost identical to the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in the federal Constitution. Id. at 21. Compare U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”) with GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1 (“No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”). 
175 See infra Part IV.B. 
176 See infra Part IV.C. 
177 See infra Part IV.D. 
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courts may adopt a more protective approach to rights of 
associations and the value of voting.  
B.  The Strength of State Court Judicial Review 
In Timmons, as in other election law cases, the Supreme 
Court balanced a state’s role as regulator with a party’s rights 
of association. Acceptance of state justifications in this 
balancing act are in keeping with a general reluctance of 
federal courts to interfere with the way a state “defines itself as 
a sovereign.”178 State courts, for obvious reasons, need not be 
concerned about disrespecting the sovereignty of their own 
state. Without federalism concerns, deference to the political 
branches need not be as extreme as it is in the federal courts.179
This is particularly true when state courts face claims from a 
minority of the population, who by their very numbers will 
never have control of the legislature.  
Some state constitutions explicitly authorize judicial 
review of state legislation.180 While federal courts rely on 
precedent to support their powers of judicial review, they are 
cautious in exercising that power, especially when asked to 
invalidate legislative actions.181 State courts, however, have 
178 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (regarding state decisions 
on the qualification of elected officers). 
179 For an argument that state courts should employ strict scrutiny in the field 
of constitutional economic rights, see Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State 
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 
(1999).
180 See Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and Evolution of Positive Rights,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 900 (1988). For example, the Georgia Constitution provides 
“Legislative acts in violation of this Constitution or the Constitution of the United 
States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.” GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5. 
The judiciary articles of other states’ constitutions similarly declare the power of 
judicial review, although often less explicitly or with limitations. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST.
art. 6, § 2 (“The Supreme Court . . . shall not declare any law unconstitutional except 
when sitting in banc.”); LA. CONST. art. V, § 5, para. D (“In addition to other appeals 
provided by this constitution, a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if a law 
or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional.”); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“The judges 
of the Supreme Court, sitting without division, shall hear and determine all cases 
involving the constitutionality of a statute.”); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“The court 
shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the Constitution 
of the United States, except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the 
Supreme Court.”); VA. CONST. § 1, para. 2 (“[T]he Supreme Court shall, by virtue of this 
Constitution, have appellate jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality of a 
law under this Constitution or the Constitution of the United States and in cases 
involving the life or liberty of any person.”).  
181 See Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A 
Constitutional Census of the 1990’s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 440 (1997) (“The 
[Supreme] Court is most deferential to legislative enactments that can claim the 
broadest democratic pedigree.”). See generally William G. Ross, The Resilience of 
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enhanced legitimacy in reviewing legislation because they act 
according to explicit state constitutional provisions.182 In 
addition, many state court judges are elected, so their role in 
reviewing legislative action is less subject to charges of anti-
majoritarianism.183 In fact, when states amended their 
constitutions to allow for the popular election of judges, they 
simultaneously limited the power granted to the legislature, 
intending that judges should help “make public policy.”184
Therefore, when reviewing anti-fusion laws, state courts carry 
with them more than just substantive law to find the laws 
invalid. They are also, perhaps more importantly, draped with 
a cloak of legitimacy.  
The Timmons opinion allows states broad power to 
enact laws that protect the major parties. State courts 
interpreting state constitutions in response to a challenge to 
anti-fusion laws would be more critical of the state’s 
justification than the Supreme Court was in Timmons. If state 
courts accept that there is a constitutionally permissible 
interest in protecting the two-party system, a more rigorous 
analysis would likely strike down anti-fusion laws because 
there is a striking lack of evidence to support the claim that 
fusion destroys the two-party system. Rather, New York’s 
experience suggests fusion voting creates a “modified two-party 
system,” where minor parties play an important role but do not 
replace the major parties.185
Perhaps more importantly, there is a lack of evidence to 
show that stable democracy requires limiting the number of 
major parties to two. State constitutions protect broad 
participation in electoral government,186 and courts scrutinizing 
the justification of anti-fusion laws should find the state’s 
protection of major parties suspect and inconsistent with state 
constitutional conceptions of popular sovereignty.
Marbury v. Madison: Why Judicial Review Has Survived So Many Attacks, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 733 (2003) (describing the challenges to federal court review of state 
legislation).  
182 Neuborne, supra note 180, at 900.  
183 See TARR, supra note 165, at 174-75 (suggesting that the election of state 
judges may explain why the legitimacy of state courts is less questioned than that of 
the U.S. Supreme Court). 
184 See id. at 122.
185 MAZMANIAN, supra note 78, at 115 (“New York State has a highly 
competitive party system with two major contenders and third party contestants that 
are able to sustain themselves over time.”).  
186 See discussion infra Part IV.C.  
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C. Political Participation Protected in State Constitutions 
Compared to the federal Constitution, state 
constitutions are extremely specific regarding their dedication 
to political participation. The first article of many state 
constitutions is a declaration of commitment to popular 
sovereignty.187 For instance, Article I, section I of the 
Washington constitution announces, “All political power is 
inherent in the people, and governments derive their just 
powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to 
protect and maintain individual rights.”188
In addition, many state constitutions explicitly provide 
for the right to vote.189 This is dramatically different than the 
federal Constitution, which may prohibit discriminatory denial 
of the right to vote, but “does not confer the right of suffrage 
upon any one.”190 State constitutions typically have language 
similar to the Pennsylvania constitution: “Elections shall be 
free and equal; and no power, civil or military, shall at any 
time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of 
suffrage.”191 The right to vote has been one of the state 
constitutional rights most frequently expanded by 
amendment.192 States have similarly demonstrated their 
187 See Tarr, supra note 165, at 11-12. See, e.g., N.H. Const. art. I (“All men 
are born equally free and independent; therefore, all government of right originates 
from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good.”); N.J.
CONST. art. I (“All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain 
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life 
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and 
obtaining safety and happiness.”);WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are born equally 
free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”).  
188 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
189 See James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy For Litigating Partisan 
Gerrymandering Claims, ELECTION L.J. 643, 648 nn.37, 38 (summarizing states’ 
provisions on elections).  
190 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874).  
191 PENN. CONST. art I, § 5. See also, e.g., IND. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“All elections 
shall be free and equal.”); S.D. CONST. art. VI, sec. 19 (“Elections shall be free and 
equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free 
exercise of the right of suffrage.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“That elections shall be free 
and equal, and the right of suffrage, as hereinafter declared, shall never be denied to 
any person entitled thereto, except upon a conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, 
previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of 
competent jurisdiction.”). 
192 See TARR, supra note 165, at 105-08. There is a major exception to this 
trend of broadening the right to vote through constitutional revisions: In many 
southern states constitutional amendments were used to disenfranchise African 
Americans during the end of the Nineteenth Century. See id. at 107.
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commitment to popular sovereignty by amending their 
constitutions to create procedures for referendum, initiative, 
and recall elections.193
Constitutional amendments expanding the voting 
population and permitting direct democracy were adopted in 
response to fears of government corruption.194 Drafters believed 
that the “main threats to rights, both collective and individual, 
were despotic officials and those seeking special privileges, 
rather than the people as a whole.”195 Thus, state constitutions 
reflect cynicism of the motives of government officials and they 
aim to prevent manipulation of the electoral system that 
protects the power of the few.196 Like Madison’s fear of factions, 
drafters of state constitutions worried that minorities could 
impede the will of the majority.197 In contrast to Madison, 
however, the minorities the state constitutional drafters 
worried about were the ones elected to positions of power, not 
the ones advocating for political change.198
When parties first began challenging election 
regulations, state courts were concerned with the rights of 
voters, not parties.199 Decisions from the late 1800s and early 
1900s expressed distress over corruption by party leaders and 
party bosses.200 Judges believed manipulative political parties 
hampered political participation.201 For some judges, distrust of 
political parties was an argument in favor of fusion voting, 
since “[p]olitical fusions among minority parties often serve as 
a check upon arrogant majority parties, or rather political 
193 JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 147-
49, 169-71, 215-18 (1972). 
194 See TARR, supra note 165, at 170 (“[T]he initiative does provide a 
mechanism for circumventing the power of political elites within state government, just 
as its early proponents had expected.”); Gardner, supra note 189, at 649 (“Progressives 
. . . sought to reform state and local government by creating institutions of direct 
democracy, such as the initiative, referendum, and recall election, which would allow 
ordinary voters to thwart plans by incumbent power-holders to serve their own 
interests and to assure their own continuation in office.”). 
195 TARR, supra note 165, at 78. More recently, this logic has motivated 
constitutional amendments providing for term limits for elected offices. See id. at 170, 
172.
196 Cf. Gardner, supra note 189, at 649-50 (arguing that state constitutions’ 
focus on electoral responsiveness suggests partisan gerrymandering claims may be 
advanced under state constitutions).  
197 See supra note 150. 
198 See TARR, supra note 165, at 78, 100, 150-51. 
199 See Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political 
Party Regulation in the State Courts, 1886-1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 892 (2000). 
200 See id. at 890.
201 See id. at 875. 
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parties whose thorough organization has enabled them to 
repeatedly elect officers that are dishonest and corrupt.”202 Most 
judges facing early cases on fusion voting, however, did not 
consider the impact anti-fusion laws had on minor parties.203
Professor Adam Winkler notes that in an era of genuine party 
competition it is “easy to understand how the courts overlooked 
the duopoly-enhancing nature of many turn-of-the-century 
reforms.”204
History now shows that anti-fusion laws were enacted 
to protect the political parties in power and they succeeded far 
better than they could have hoped.205 In Timmons, the Supreme 
Court was willing to allow states to purposefully favor two 
major parties, but state constitutions would not provide that 
leeway. State constitutions are drafted to prevent laws that are 
enacted to protect the privileges of the elected. Unless current 
legislators can defend anti-fusion laws with less partisan 
motives than those of the past, this manipulation of the 
electoral scheme should not only fail to justify such laws, it 
should result in their invalidity.  
D.  Freedom of Expression Protected in State Constitutions 
Like the federal Constitution, state constitutions 
contain specific provisions protecting freedom of speech and 
assembly.206 In the resurgence of state constitutional law of the 
last twenty-five years, freedom of expression has been one of 
the most watched areas.207 Several courts have held that their 
202 State ex rel. Dunn v. Coburn, 168 S.W. 956, 964 (Mo. 1914) (Brown, J., 
dissenting).
203 Early court challenges to anti-fusion voting laws were generally brought as 
claims under state constitutional rights to vote by ballot, and rights of free and equal 
elections. See, e.g., Dunn, 168 S.W. at 964; State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson, 76 N.W. 
482 (Wis. 1898); State ex rel. Bateman v. Bode, 45 N.E. 195 (Ohio 1896); State ex rel.
Sturdevant v. Allen, 62 N.W. 35 (Neb. 1895). This note explores modern challenges to 
anti-fusion laws based on freedom of expression and association, but even future 
challenges based on the right to vote are not precluded by these cases. The value of 
competition in the electoral arena may play a different role in challenges to anti-fusion 
laws brought today, as opposed to ones brought a century ago since the context of 
elections has changed dramatically. Cf. Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs,
supra note 199, at 892-95 (describing party competition at the turn of the century).  
204 See Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs, supra note 199, at 892. 
205 See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 288. 
206 See Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for 
a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125 (1969) (listing the states with freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly and other Bill of Rights’ provisions in their constitutions). 
207 See, e.g., Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Expressive Liberties in the State Courts: 
Their Permissible Reach and Sanctioned Restraints, 67 ALB. L. REV. 655 (2004); Seth F. 
Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of Free Expression, 5 U. PA. J.
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state constitutions provide a broader right to free expression 
than the federal Constitution.208 This suggests state protections 
for expression may cover a broader range of activities than the 
First Amendment, specifically, the activities of voting and 
association. 
The earliest state constitutions were drafted during the 
American Revolutionary war.209 Almost all included guarantees 
of freedom of speech.210 This is hardly surprising given the 
resentment towards British attempts to limit expression in the 
colonies.211 Freedom of expression was seen as having “a direct 
relationship to freedom from government oppression.”212 State 
courts have relied on this history in finding state constitutional 
law protects a wide range of expressive activities.213 Of course, 
some states drafted constitutions after the adoption of the 
federal Bill of Rights.214 But those states borrowed the broad 
language of older state constitutions in protecting free speech, 
instead of copying the federal Constitution.215
Forty-one state constitutions protect the right of 
expression with affirmative avowals of the right to speak.216
CONST. L. 12 (2002); Todd F. Simon, Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions 
and Protection of Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305 (1985). 
208 See, e.g., People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Colo. 1989) (“[O]ur 
constitution extends broader protection to freedom of expression than does the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution.”). See also infra notes 213, 226 and 
accompanying text. 
209 See TARR, supra note 165, at 61 (providing a table of states constitutions 
and the date of their adoption).  
210 See Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling the Void: Speech and Press in State 
Courts prior to Gitlow in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 17 (Bill F. Chamberlin & 
Charlene J. Brown eds., 1982). 
211 See id. at 21.
212 See id.  
213 For example, in Pennsylvania, the highest court has paid special attention 
to the history of the Pennsylvania’s founder, William Penn, in analyzing the text of its 
constitution:  
[Since] William Penn[] was prosecuted in England for the “crime” of 
preaching to an unlawful assembly and persecuted by the court for daring to 
proclaim his right to a trial by an uncoerced jury . . . [i]t is small wonder . . . 
the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, and petition have been guaranteed 
since the first Pennsylvania Constitution, not simply as restrictions on the 
powers of government, as found in the Federal Constitution, but as inherent 
and “invaluable” rights of man. 
Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1388 (Pa. 1981).  
214 See TARR, supra note 165, at 61. 
215 See FRIESEN, supra note 160, § 5-2. Today, every state provides for the 
rights of speech in their constitution. See Force, supra note 206, at 125.  
216 For a listing of state free speech and press provisions, see FRIESEN, supra
note 160, at app. 5 and Note, Private Abridgement of Speech and the State 
Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 180-81 n.79 (1980).  
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Kansas’ constitution provides, “The liberty of the press shall be 
inviolate; and all persons may freely speak, write or publish 
their sentiments on all subjects.”217 Similarly, the Michigan 
constitution says, “Every person may freely speak, write, 
express and publish his views on all subjects.”218 These 
provisions are typical.219
Forty-six states have provisions guaranteeing the right 
to assembly220 and these provisions are often expressed as 
positive declarations as well. Using Kansas and Michigan as 
examples once again, Kansas’ constitution provides, “The 
people have the right to assemble, in a peaceable manner, to 
consult for their common good, to instruct their 
representatives, and to petition the government, or any 
department thereof, for the redress of grievances.”221 The 
langauge of the Michigan constituion is nearly identical.222
Although these provisions of state constitutions protect 
a right similar to the First Amendment of the federal 
Constitution, their distinct language implies they deserve a 
distinct analysis.223 Most state constitutional provisions are in 
sharp contrast to the federal Constitution, which simply 
declares that “Congress shall make no law” restraining 
expressive rights,224 and does not provide a positive guarantee. 
The affirmative nature of the state provisions illustrates the 
spirit in which they were enacted, celebrating the fundamental 
rights of state citizens of which freedom of speech was a 
priority.225 Relying on this, some states have found that under 
217 KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 11. 
218 MICH. CONST. art. I § 5. 
219 See FRIESEN, supra note 160, at app. 5.  
220 See Force, supra note 206, at 139. 
221 KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 3. 
222 See MICH. CONST. art. I § 5 (“The people have a right to peaceably to 
assemble, to consult of the common good, to instruct their representatives and petition 
the government for redress of grievance.”).
223 See Kevin Francis O’Neill, The Road Not Taken: State Constitutions as an 
Alternative Source of Protection for Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 
31 (1993) (“If a court were interpreting contractual terms, would it conclude, as readily 
as some courts have, that these clauses are coextensive?”). 
224 The First Amendment in the federal Constitution reads, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
225 See Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and 
Protections of Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 310 (1985) (“Freedom of 
the press was considered the right of greatest importance, at least initially, and 
assuring freedom of expression was a primary concern of settlers in new states.”). 
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their constitutions infringements of the rights of speech can 
occur when there is no state action.226 In New Jersey, for 
instance, state courts have relied on the affirmative nature of 
the free speech provision to hold that the state constitution 
provides a right to distribute political leaflets in shopping 
centers even though the federal Constitution would not provide 
that right.227  
A broad right to freedom of expression is valuable in 
challenging anti-fusion laws for two reasons. First, freedom of 
association is an offshoot of freedom of expression, so the scope 
of protection for speech is indicative of the protection 
associations will be given. Second, voting is an expressive act. 
Freedom of expression in the federal Constitution does not 
protect the act of voting,228 but freedom of expression in state 
constitutions should.  
1. Broad Right of Expression Protects Associations  
The rights of political parties are in essence the rights of 
voters who have collectivized in order to engage in more 
efficient expression. Since state constitutional language and 
history suggest broader protection for expression than the 
federal Constitution, state constitutions should be construed to 
provide greater protection for associational rights of political 
parties.  
Although political parties did not exist at the time the 
federal Constitution was drafted, its framers sought to guard 
against the danger of “factions,” which James Madison defined 
as groups of citizens “united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest.”229 The Supreme Court, 
therefore, was understandably slow in developing a freedom of 
association doctrine to protect the very group activity Madison 
 226 N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 
A.2d 757, 771 (N.J. 1993) (“[T]he State right of free speech is protected not only from 
abridgement by government, but also from unreasonably restrictive and oppressive 
conduct by private entities.”). 
 227 See id. at 770-71. 
 228 See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. 
 229 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). Similarly, of the Democratic-
Republican societies forming in 1794, George Washington said, “All combinations and 
associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, 
control, counteract or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted 
authorities are . . . of fatal tendency.” ROBERT J. BRESLER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
23 (2004) (quoting President George Washington, Farewell Address to the People of the 
United States (Sept. 17, 1796), in INDEP. CHRON., Sept. 26, 1796).  
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feared.230 State courts, however, were quicker to recognize the 
democratic value and necessity of associations.231 Half a century 
before the Supreme Court said there was constitutional 
protection for associations, state courts had recognized that 
political parties are protected under fundamental rights of 
speech and assembly.232 The highest court of California wrote in 
1900,
No one, it would seem, can be so thoughtless as not to realize that 
government by the people is a progressive institution, which seeks to 
give expression and effect to the wisest and best ideas of its 
members. . . . [E]lectors . . . may freely assemble, organize 
themselves into a political party, and use all legitimate means to 
carry their principles of government into active operation through 
the suffrages of their fellows. Such a right is fundamental.233
Similarly the Wisconsin Supreme court declared in 1910 
that “[t]he right of members of a political party to freely 
assemble, deliberate and act, to promote the interest of such 
party, is a right guaranteed by the Constitution, state and 
national. Freedom to do those things, reasonably appropriate to 
the effective maintenance of party organization, cannot be 
abridged.”234 While acknowledging constitutional protections for 
political parties, state courts also allowed state legislatures to 
regulate them. Political parties, these courts recognized, are 
more than private associations. They are part of the machinery 
of democracy.235 State courts upheld Australian ballot laws and 
other reforms, not because they rejected the constitutional 
rights of parties, but rather because they believed electoral 
regulations would increase voter choice and opportunity.236
These courts sustained regulations that they thought would 
protect the rights of voters to participate effectively in party 
organizations.237
230 See BRESLER, supra note 229, at 25, 32. 
231 The fact that state courts considered the rights of political parties before 
the U.S. Supreme Court is likely a result of the historical development of the 
incorporation doctrine. It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court applied the First 
Amendment to state action. See supra note 108. 
232 See Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs, supra note 199, at 874.  
233 See Britton v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs. of San Francisco, 61 P. 1115, 1117 
(Ca. 1900).  
234 See, e.g., State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 125 N.W. 961, 976-77 (Wis. 
1910).
235 See Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs, supra note 199, at 881-82. 
236 See id. at 884 (“Protecting and preserving the ability of voters to make 
effective use of electoral opportunities free from the corrupting influence of party 
leaders led most state courts to uphold laws restricting ballot access.”). 
237 See People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 58 N.E. 124, 125-26 
128
1414 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4 
Today, anti-fusion laws limit voter choice rather than 
ensure it. By preventing parties and their supporters from 
nominating their selected candidates, anti-fusion laws run 
afoul of a long tradition of state protection for voter 
participation as expressed through political parties.  
2. Broad Right of Expression Protects the Act of Voting  
In addition to association as a derivative right of 
freedom of speech, freedom of expression on its own might 
prohibit anti-fusion laws. As discussed above, voting may be 
considered an expressive act.238 Using the facts of Timmons as 
an example, New Party members wanted to vote for Andy 
Dawkins on the New Party ballot line to express a message 
that they felt would not be expressed by voting for him on the 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor ballot line, namely, that the 
Democratic Party was too centrist.239 That the medium for this 
voter communiqué would be the ballot does not change its 
essential expressive nature.  
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Timmons 
rejected the link between voting and expression. State courts, 
however, are free to take another approach.  No trend of 
protection for the expressive nature of voting has yet emerged 
in state courts, but there are promising harbingers. Several 
states have found state constitutional protection for write-in 
votes, for instance.240 Recently, the Utah Supreme Court 
described the constitutional right to vote for a ballot initiative 
as important because it “encourages political dialogue” as well 
as “allows the general populace to have substantive and 
meaningful participation in enacting legislation.”241 Oregon’s 
Judge Landau has gone further in acknowledging the ballot as 
a place of expression. In Freedom Socialist Party v. Bradbury, 
(N.Y. 1900) (upholding a statute that the court believed was intended to “permit the 
voters to construct the organization from the bottom upwards, instead of permitting 
[party] leaders to construct it from the top downwards”). See Winkler, Voters’ Rights 
and Parties’ Wrongs, supra note 199, at 880 (quoting this and other cases from the 
period). 
 238 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.  
 239 See DISCH, supra note 10, at 17-18. 
 240 See Littlejohn v. People ex rel. Desch, 121 P. 159 (Colo. 1912); Smith v. 
Smathers, 372 SO. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979); Thompson v. Wilson, 155 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. 1967). 
Even though these cases have protected write-in votes under the right to vote, and not 
under freedom of expression, they suggest state constitutions differ in their 
understanding of the value of voting from the federal Constitution. See supra notes 92-
100 and accompanying text. 
 241 Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081 (2002).  
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the Oregon Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of 
a statute preventing the Freedom Socialist Party from using 
their party name on the ballot because the Socialist party 
already had been given an exclusive right to the use of its name 
and the word “socialist.”242 In a concurring opinion, Judge 
Landau found the statute limited the ability of a political party 
to communicate its message to the public, and this was a 
violation the Oregon constitutional right to free speech.243
State constitutions value voting more than the federal 
Constitution.244 Moreover, they offer more protection for 
expressive activities. Therefore, state courts should understand 
voting as an act of expression. Fusion voting is especially 
motivated by an urge to express one’s political views. As 
recognized by Justice Stevens, fusion allows voters to indicate 
views they feel are not sufficiently represented by the major 
parties, while still allowing them to vote for the candidate they 
hope will win the election.245 Fusion voting, then, should receive 
constitutional protection as part of states’ protection of 
expression.
V.  CONCLUSION 
Legislators enacted anti-fusion laws in order to ensure 
their reelections, not as part of a noble defense of government 
stability. In Timmons, the Supreme Court declared states have 
the right to enact such laws to protect the two-party system. 
State courts interpreting state constitutions should treat 
challenges to anti-fusion laws differently. Drafters of state 
constitutions were dedicated to expansive political 
participation and were cynical of elected power. Sustaining 
laws that have the purpose of limiting the viability of minor 
parties reduces voter choice and shields established politicians 
from challenges. Anti-fusion laws, then, are incompatible with 
the goals of state constitutions. Moreover, protection of the two-
party system is an especially weak defense for these laws in 
242 Freedom Socialist Party v. Bradbury, 48 P.3d 199, 200 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
The majority found the statute unconstitutional under the federal Constitution’s First 
Amendment and never addressed whether there was a state constitutional violation, 
noting that parties did not a raise a state constitutional issue on appeal. See id. at 201 
n.2.
243 See id. at 208 (Landau, J., concurring) (“[T]he statute prohibits a political 
party from using specified words in communicating a message to members of the voting 
public.”). 
244 See supra Part IV.C.  
245 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 381 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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states that value free expression. Anti-fusion laws infringe 
upon the rights of voters to express their political beliefs and 
the rights of parties and their adherents to associate.
Many voters are unhappy with their choices on Election 
Day but anti-fusion laws allow them no satisfying options. 
They can “hold their nose” and vote for the candidate they 
believe is the lesser of two evils246 or they can cast a vote that is 
unlikely to translate into actual political power. A revival of 
fusion voting would solve this dilemma, but after the Timmons
opinion was issued, a revival of fusion voting appeared 
unlikely. Examining state constitutions reveals a different 
future—anti-fusion laws are not as unassailable as they may 
seem. State courts have the ability, authority and obligation to 
invalidate anti-fusion laws and thereby liberate voters and 
parties alike.
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Appendix:
HYPOTHETICAL BALLOT IN A FUSION VOTING SYSTEM
BALLOT
Make your selection by filling in one of the circles. 
Party Democrat Republican Purple
Candidate
for Office
Candidate X Candidate Y Candidate X 
HYPOTHETICAL ELECTIONS RESULTS
Votes for Candidate Y as Republican ...............................................48%
Votes for Candidate X as Democrat ..................................................44%
Votes for Candidate X as Purple .........................................................8%
Candidate X is declared the winner with 52% of the
vote.
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